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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF STATES OF EMERGENCY ON GUBERNATORIAL APPROVAL 
RATINGS 
 
 
To what extent do unexpected, apolitical events affect governors’ popularity? 
Individuals’ attitudes towards government are often random, and executives at both the 
state-level and national-level are held accountable for events that they have little control 
over. In this study, I seek to understand how these unplanned events affect support for 
elected officials. Specifically, I examine the effect of the declaration of a State of 
Emergency on gubernatorial approval. I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) model and 
data from FEMA as well as the United States Officials Job Approval Ratings dataset to 
answer such questions. The results indicate that not only do natural and manmade 
disasters NOT have a negative effect on governors’ popularity, there is actually no 
correlation between the two variables at all. Instead, I find that relative to one another, 
major disaster declarations have a stronger negative effect on a governor’s approval 
ratings than emergency declarations. Though surprising, I suggest that these disasters 
simply do not affect enough individuals for a long enough time to have an impact on 
gubernatorial popularity. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
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1.1 Introduction 
  On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall on the coast of 
southeastern Louisiana. What was originally supposed to be a tropical depression 
strengthened into a Category 5 hurricane with winds of up to 140 miles per hour 
spanning hundreds of miles. Storm surges flooded coastal cities up to 30 feet 
above sea level resulting in the devastation of beaches, homes, and infrastructure. 
An estimated $160 billion in damages were caused by Hurricane Katrina, and 
years passed before these coastal cities recovered. It is considered one of the 
worst natural disasters in U.S. history.  
  The aftereffects of Hurricane Katrina were felt socially, culturally, 
economically, and politically. Politically, the criticism of the federal response to 
Hurricane Katrina has been widely documented in new sources and academic 
journals alike. President George W. Bush’s approval ratings crashed as his 
appointed director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) failed 
to adequately respond to the disaster. However, much less is known of 
constituents’ impressions of the state and local-level responses. Governor 
Kathleen Blanco had been serving for a mere year and a half prior to the disaster 
and ultimately decided not to seek reelection after her short tenure. A Gallup poll 
804 respondents in New Orleans revealed that 54% of residents approved of 
Mayor Ray Nagin’s response to the tragedy and 50% approved of the local police 
force, while only 33% approved of Governor Blanco’s handling of the event. In 
comparison, 23% of residents approved of President Bush’s relief efforts, and a 
mere 22% approved of the measures of FEMA. Despite being in relatively good 
standing prior to the disaster declaration, Governor Blanco carried a significant 
burden in her preparedness and response to the storm.  
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  Not only did the citizens of Louisiana form opinions on her preparedness 
and response to the storm, but she also became a subject of criticism nationwide. 
This visceral reaction to elected officials of all levels begged the question of 
when, how, and why constituents hold their leaders accountable. How did Mayor 
Nagin escape Hurricane Katrina relatively unscathed while Governor Blanco, 
President Bush, and FEMA took the bulk of the blame? Incumbent politicians are 
rewarded and punished in any democracy, but why were state and federal figures 
held more accountable than local authorities?  
  Elected officials have long since been blamed for events out of their 
control. Pharaohs were held responsible for the flooding of the Nile River, and 
rulers of the Middle Ages were blamed for the spread of the plague (King and 
Cohen 2005). More recently, even elected officials in the United States have seen 
a decrease in support following a series of catastrophic shark attacks (Achen and 
Bartels 2013). Though our elected officials are clearly not responsible for these 
unforeseen events, these examples of retrospective evaluation may have a 
significant effect on their decision-making. In an effort to avoid a dip in approval 
ratings, elected officials may begin acting proactively rather than reactively in 
anticipation of looming natural disasters or suspected terrorist attacks. In this 
paper, I seek to address the relationship between these unplanned events and 
individuals’ attitudes towards government. Specifically, I examine state-level 
politics to test whether individuals evaluate their governor retrospectively 
following States of Emergency.  
4 
 
  State governments have seen an increase in autonomy in past decades 
given the rise of “states’ rights” issues, such as welfare reform, marijuana 
legalization, and marriage equality (King and Cohen 2005). Such issues have 
given rise to the importance of the governorship. Much like the presidency, 
governors have seen an expansion of executive power, both formal and informal. 
Formally, governors have exercised more power with line-item vetoes, 
appointments, and budgetary control. Informally, governors have taken to agenda 
setting and have gained national-level attention as a result of policy diffusion 
(King and Cohen 2005). Among the most important determinants of gubernatorial 
power is also the most inconstant: popularity.  
  An understanding of individuals’ evaluations of their governors may yield 
important insights into the decision-making of these state-level executives. In an 
attempt to understand this relationship, I will first review the most relevant 
research in both the presidential and gubernatorial bodies of literature. I will then 
apply a theory of blind retrospection to the governorship. Using data from the 
United States Officials Job Approval Ratings dataset, I will test my hypothesis 
with ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. My results indicate that while 
natural and manmade disasters themselves do not have a significant impact on 
gubernatorial popularity, relative to one another, major disaster declarations have 
a greater negative effect on approval ratings than emergency declarations. Such 
findings shed light on the importance of precautionary measures and proper 
responses to catastrophes as elective officials will be held responsible as the 
damages increase.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
  In the U.S., a simple Google search yields decades of presidential and 
congressional approval ratings but rarely are their importance discussed. What are 
approval ratings? Why do they matter? Project FiveThirtyEight may tell its 
readers that President Trump is sitting at a 53.5% approval rating, but we don’t 
see any further discussion of the substantive effects of this number. Does a 
sustained 50% approval rating result in a president persuading Congress to pass 
more legislation? What are the mechanisms by which a president can translate his 
or her approval ratings into informal power? The reporting of a simple percentage 
does not tell the full story. Believe it or not, even the most powerful of dignitaries 
care about the affections of their populace. A totalitarian must be especially aware 
of his or her dissenters, knowing exactly how many resources to devote to 
suppression. In a democracy, powerful are those who can continue to win 
reelection and continue to shape the political landscape. In the case of executives, 
both presidents and governors have an acute advantage in their party and over 
their legislatures should their approval ratings be high. The power of elected 
officials is directly derived from their constituencies. 
  It would appear as though the easiest way to gauge executive popularity is 
via elections or retrospective evaluation. If we like our governor or president, we 
vote him or her into office; if we dislike our governor or president, we vote him or 
her out of office. A typical understanding of retrospective voting is that each 
election is a referendum, and voters use policy outcomes as a measure of whether 
or not they like or dislike an elected official. Citizens will continue to vote for 
representatives who sign bills that provide funding to their roads, parks, and 
schools, regardless of the policy instruments used to secure such funding.  
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  Retrospective voting differs from the concept of prospective voting, in 
which constituents vote for candidates based on their promises for the future. 
Though simplistic, this model of retrospective evaluation (Fiorina 1981) offers 
only a snapshot into the approval ratings of an elected official. The results of a 
single election cannot be a fair comparison to the ebb and flow in approval ratings 
throughout the entirety of president's or governor’s term. Election results account 
for competition between candidates but do not capture the nuances of voters’ 
expectations of an executive and his or her job performance. 
  Furthermore, election results can be seemingly random. Achen and Bartels 
(2012) discuss a theory of “blind retrospection”, in which voters reward or punish 
their incumbent candidates as a result of unrelated, apolitical events. In 1916, 
President Woodrow Wilson lost a significant number of votes from a New Jersey 
community following an unfortunate cluster of shark attacks on their beach 
(Achen and Bartels 2012). Citizens demanded help from the federal government, 
but no agencies existed at the time to offer any assistance. Following the tragedy, 
President Wilson lost nearly all of the votes in New Jersey.  Four months had 
passed since the attacks, but towns on the New Jersey shoreline were still feeling 
the effects of decreased tourism to their beaches. Achen and Bartels argue that 
voters are not always punishing incumbent candidates for their inadequate 
responses to these events. In this case, there were no mechanisms in place for the 
federal government to assist in such a localized disaster, and citizens could not 
have possibly expected for President Wilson to correct the issue. Blind 
retrospective differs from our typical understanding of retrospective evaluation in 
that citizens are not making direct connections between their own welfare and the 
actions of their incumbents. It is quite literally leaving electoral outcomes up to 
chance.  
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  If elections results tell an incomplete story of executive popularity, we 
must consider more precise and continual measures of popularity. Pollsters have 
long sought to quantify the attitudes and beliefs of individuals via public opinion. 
As early as the 1930s, polling organizations have gauged Americans’ responses to 
major political and economic events as well as their well-being on a weekly and 
monthly basis. Most notably, since 2008, Gallup has been administering daily 
questionnaires asking 500 respondents whether they approve or disapprove of the 
job the current president is doing. Approval ratings have ranged anywhere from 
President Truman’s low of 22% during the Korean War in 1952 to President Bush’s 
high of 90% following the September 11 attacks in 2001. The frequency and 
accuracy of such polls has increased with the use of weighted samples and random-
digit-dialing, securing Gallup’s position as the standard measurement of 
presidential approval ratings.  
 Polling data may give us a quick, easily-digestible numerical 
representation of presidential approval, but it does not tell us why individuals 
evaluate presidents the way they do. This begs the question: How do we 
determine the popularity of our state and national-level executives? Mueller 
(1970) identifies four main predictors of presidential popularity: time in office, 
“rally around the flag” effects, economic recession, and war. The approval rating 
of any given president is inevitably a function of time, and though time yields 
experience, the number of days a president has served does not work in his or her 
favor. The longer he or she is in office, the lower his or her approval ratings will 
be. Even the most favorable of presidents, including President Reagan, can begin 
their terms with approval ratings of 60% or more and finish their terms with 
approval ratings lower than 50%. A second determinant of whether or not we like 
our president is economic prosperity. Presidents who are fortunate to serve in 
economic booms, such as President Clinton, have undoubtedly fared well in the 
public light while Presidents Hoover and Carter are still remembered for the 
economic busts they presided over.  
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 Lengthy terms and economic recession may, however, be mitigated by 
external threat. Known as the “rally around the flag” effect, a president may 
experience a bump in approval ratings following a conflict with another state. 
Citizens are subject to an “us” vs. “them” mentality and rally in support of the 
president as he or she works to de-escalate the conflict. Such an effect gives the 
president unchecked power as members of Congress are weary to speak out 
against a president during times of conflict. Most notable, President G.W. Bush 
experienced approval ratings as high as 90% following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001. Such popularity allowed him unparalleled success in pushing 
legislation through Congress. Though powerful, the “rally around the flag” effect 
is likely short-lived if the U.S. is to become embroiled in a long, costly war. 
Presidents quickly fall out of favor when it is perceived that the U.S. is “losing” a 
conflict and fatalities and expenses are not justified. Despite initial support for the 
Vietnam War, President Johnson faced approval ratings as low as 35% as the 
costs of war became clear. Each president has experienced both wins and losses as 
a result of his approval rating. Though these institutional parameters offer a 
streamlined, predictive model of presidential popularity, there may be other 
individual-level factors influencing how we evaluate our executives.  
 Thus far, I have referred to governors and presidents interchangeably as 
“executives”. In many ways, the governorship mimics the presidency. Though 
lengthier, state constitutions have modeled their executive branch to create a 
singular actor not unlike the president. Governors and presidents control their 
respective bureaucracies and negotiate with their respective legislatures. Most 
importantly, both governors and presidents are the most visible actors in their 
arena, allowing for the most variance of approval ratings.  
9 
 
 Distinct from the president, governors garner their popularity through 
more localized policy initiatives. They are able to do so through informal and 
formal powers (Beyle 1999).  Among these informal powers is popularity with the 
public. Intuitively, more popular governors have more political capital to have 
their agendas passed. King and Cohen (2005) note that despite the importance of 
this political capital, little research has been done to explore what factors motivate 
a governors’ popularity. Existing studies accounted only for economic factors 
(Adams and Squire 2001) or national climate (Crew and Weiher 1996) with little 
consideration for unexpected events such as disaster declarations. Much like 
presidents, governors fare better in periods of economic prosperity. Governors 
also benefit if a president of their party is becoming more popular. Models of 
presidential approval have also been applied to the state-level executives without 
consideration of the nuances between the two offices.   
 There are a number of distinctions between the two executives that 
prevent models of presidential approval from being applied to the governorship. 
Unlike models of presidential approval, King and Cohen (2005) suggest that 
models of gubernatorial approval must account for both state-level and national-
level factors. Much to the dismay of the Framers and the 10th Amendment, state 
politics are often reactionary to national politics (King and Cohen 2005). 
Statewide elections occurring during midterm years can serve as a referenda 
against the national government. As such, presidential approval ratings, as well as 
shared state partisanship, can be predictors of gubernatorial popularity. Other 
state-level factors similar to those in models of presidential approval ratings 
include unemployment and divided government.  
10 
 
 The passage of time, economic fluxes, and foreign affairs can be 
anticipated in any given presidency or governorship, but how do we evaluate our 
elected officials when things don't go according to plan? In the case of presidents, 
non-domestic events with foreign actors, such as war or acts of terrorism, result in 
a “rally around the flag” effect (Mueller 1973). However, it is unlikely that a 
governor is held directly responsible for such international-level events.  
 Instead, governors may be held responsible for state-level emergencies 
including natural and manmade disasters. Storms such as tornadoes, hurricanes, 
and earthquakes; chemical and biological leaks; radiation; contaminated water; 
and even viruses are generally most impactful at the state-level.  In such 
emergencies, individuals may use more individual-level factors rather than 
institutional factors in evaluating their executive. Individuals’ evaluations of their 
elected officials are a product of their own well-being. If one’s situation changes 
for the worst following a disaster, he or she may hold his or her representatives, 
senators, governor, and president responsible. Existing models of gubernatorial 
approval ratings mimic those of the presidency, including national-level 
institutional factors, but do not account for localized, state-level emergencies that 
may change individuals’ expectations and evaluations of their governors. 
 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) itself defines the 
disaster declaration process in the plainest terms: “all emergency and major 
disaster declarations are made solely at the discretion of the President of the 
United States”, and “all requests for a declaration by the President that a major 
disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.” Each state 
must conduct a Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA) through its FEMA 
Regional Office to determine the scale of the disaster and what type of assistance 
is warranted. Such assistance must be beyond the capabilities of the state.  
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 FEMA notes two types of disaster declarations: emergency declarations 
and major disaster declarations. Both must be requested by the governor of the 
state in need. The president will often provide assistance in both types of 
declarations, but each will differ in the type of assistance offered.  
 Whether natural or manmade, a catastrophe can result in an emergency 
declaration if the funding will not exceed $5 million dollars, which includes 
Public Assistance (PA) and Individual Assistance (IA). PA covers damage to 
publicly-owned facilities, while IA services households not covered by insurance. 
Emergency declarations do not receive funding for any preventative measures for 
future catastrophes. Major disaster declarations are reserved for natural events 
such as hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, snowstorms, fires, floods, 
droughts, and volcanic eruptions. Both responsive and preventative assistance are 
available for major disaster declarations. Much like emergency declarations, PA 
and IA are available for immediate recovery. The president can also provide 
Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA) programs to prevent further loss and injury 
in future natural disasters.  
 Though these manmade and natural disasters occur at random, the rate at 
which a president signs an emergency declaration or major disaster declaration is 
dependent on a number of predictable factors. Garrett and Sobel (2003) find that 
states that are politically important to the president have higher rates of disaster 
declaration. Not only are more disasters declared, but more funding is allocated as 
well in the form of PA, IA, and HMA. Such increases are especially visible 
during election years, suggesting that this assistance is politically motivated rather 
than altruistic. Reeves (2011) echoes this concern, suggesting that governors are 
“opportunists”. Because presidents are able to unilaterally allocate funding to 
specific constituencies, they do so to bolster their electoral gains, and voters in 
competitive states reward presidents for their disaster declarations.  
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 Gasper and Reeves (2012) expand this study to include the political 
motivations of governors as well. They see each federally funded dollar as a 
potential vote for state and local-level officials. They also hypothesize whether 
governors are less likely to request assistance if the disaster declaration may 
benefit a president of the opposite party. Thankfully, while governors up for 
reelection may behave opportunistically, there is no evidence to support partisan 
motivations. Even those from competitive states request disaster declarations from 
presidents of opposing parties. Not surprisingly, Cutter and Emrich (2005) 
confirm that not only are the geographic patterns of disaster declarations 
inconsistent with actual weather patterns, but that estimated damages from these 
catastrophes are increasing each year. It is no secret to federal, state, and local 
elected officials that funding for catastrophes can equal major political capital.    
 While robust, the two bodies of literature on both gubernatorial approval 
ratings and disaster declarations have yet to be synthesized. Existing models of 
executive popularity do not account for unexpected catastrophes such as 
hurricanes or acts of terrorism, nor do studies of disaster declarations discuss the 
long-term effects on the political arena. We do not currently have an 
understanding of how constituents view their state and local-level officials 
following a grisly, unplanned event, and how a possible change in popularity may 
affect their informal powers to enact legislation and chances at reelection.  
1.3 Theory and Hypothesis 
 Thus far, our knowledge of gubernatorial popularity is deeply rooted in the 
literature on presidential approval ratings. Political scientists have conceived of 
governors’ popularity not only as a function of individual-level characteristics but 
also national-level characteristics as well. Though robust, existing models have 
accounted for political and economic activity with little regard to more 
unexpected events that take place outside of the political area and economy. Such 
events, including natural disasters and acts of mass violence and terrorism, have 
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occurred frequently enough to demand attention from scholars. The most notable 
and recognizable of natural disasters, Hurricane Katrina, in 2005, exhibited just 
how powerful of an effect these events may have on the elected officials who 
handle them.   
  Though there is no exact parallel to mirror a catastrophe in existing 
models, a “rally around the flag” effect such as a skirmish or war may be most 
similar to the occurrence of a disaster given its unexpectedness. In cases of 
conflict, presidents have historically enjoyed a bump in approval ratings, most 
likely due to the togetherness felt when rallying around a common enemy. In a 
natural disaster, there is no “other” to fight against. There also is no valor or 
victory involved a natural disaster to boost approval ratings. Even the best 
outcomes, such as a rebuilt community or the creation of new jobs, may not come 
about until long after a governor’s tenure.   
 Not only is there no enemy to act as a scapegoat, constituents in the wake 
of a storm or fire will likely experience negative, sustained effects from its 
damage, and regardless of their culpability, elected officials will be to blame. It is 
known that individuals vote based on their personal wellbeing. Following a 
disaster, constituents are not only subject to physical damage to their homes, 
schools, businesses, and parks, but also economic hardship and mental duress. As 
an individual’s wellbeing decreases, their discontent for their politicians will 
increase.  As seen in the case of Hurricane Katrina, voters may still be rebuilding 
their lives weeks, months, and even years after the catastrophe. Even if it is not an 
election year, the response to a disaster may continue to haunt elected officials 
until the end of their term. Even if a perfect response to a tragedy is executed, 
constituents will likely still punish their elected officials for the subsequent 
hardships. 
  The most visible, singular actors are also more susceptible to punishment 
by the electorate. At the state-level, governors are the most easily identifiable 
politicians, while state legislatures and courts may fly under the radar; therefore, I 
anticipate that governors will be held most responsible following a catastrophic 
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event. While voters may not even be able to name their state-level senator or 
representative, they are more likely to know their governor’s name and fame. 
Constituents will punish their elected officials despite the unexpected, improbable 
occurrence of a disaster, and their governor will be held accountable for any 
subsequent shortcomings in their quality of life.  
 In addition to their name-recognition, governors are also a key player in 
the response effort following a catastrophe. The president cannot act until the 
governor has specifically requested support from the federal government. Despite 
the resources available from the federal government, governors must act first 
before receiving aid from FEMA. The hours after natural disasters have hit are 
crucial as a governor must discern whether or not to act. The duration from the 
beginning of a storm, attack, etc. to the moment a state of emergency is highly 
dependent on a governor’s course of action. A state of emergency may even be 
declared at the state-level by a governor and not declared as a disaster at the 
national-level by the president if the governor does not make a compelling case 
for assistance. Because of this chain of command, governors are left highly 
culpable for the funding or lack thereof following the occurrence of a disaster.  
  Given their visibility, I expect to see a dip in approval ratings for 
governors following such catastrophes. Hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, 
chemical spills, and mass violence all result in a decrease in the quality of life for 
constituents. Thus, they will turn to the most singular actor in the political system 
to alleviate the problem. Presidents and other federal-level officials cannot begin 
to act in an emergency until a governor has performed his or her duties. Even if 
the perfect response to a disaster declaration is executive, a governor’s popularity 
will still suffer as the infrastructural and economic effects will likely persist for 
weeks, months, or even years following an emergency.  
 
  H1: Governors’ approval ratings will decrease following the occurrence of 
  a disaster declaration
15 
 
CHAPTER 2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
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2.1 Dependent Variable: Gubernatorial Popularity (JAR Data) 
  Approval ratings for national-level executives and institutions have been 
readily available for decades. Political scientists and laymen alike have been 
tracking the popularity of the president, Congress, and the Supreme Court daily 
for a number of years. The country watched as President Nixon’s approval ratings 
fell to 24% following the Watergate scandal, and Republicans and Democrats 
alike mobilized as President George W. Bush’s approving ratings skyrocketed to 
90% following the September 11th tragedy. Such popularity, or lack thereof, is 
important as it has become the standard by which we judge our elected officials.  
  State politics scholars, however, have not been so fortunate. How did the 
state of Louisiana respond to Governor Blanco’s efforts following Hurricane 
Katrina? Prior to the compilation of the U.S. Job Approval Ratings (JAR) dataset 
in 1999, approval ratings for governors and state legislatures were almost non-
existent (Beyle et al. 2002). While states did collect this data, it was rarely 
available to the public and was not organized in any meaningful way. Each state 
collected its data differently, with varying questions, scales, and time frames. The 
JAR dataset mitigated these differences with a single, compiled dataset using 
percent positions as a mean of standardizing the various approval ratings.  
  A growing interest in state-politics research has demanded an aggregation 
of such approval ratings. Though it has yet to be updated, it remains the only 
compilation of state-level approval ratings available to the public. The JAR 
dataset combines state-level approval ratings for all 50 states using data gathered 
from commercial, media, and university survey organizations from 1947 to 2000. 
These are aggregate data rather than an expansive list of the original individual-
level survey responses from each state.  
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  Though innovative, the JAR dataset is not without its faults, and the 
collectors of these data have mitigated these variances using aggregation. 
Measurements of gubernatorial popularity are not consistent across states. Some 
questionnaires may use language such as “approve or disapprove” while others 
may allow participants to rank their responses as “excellent”, “good/fair”, or 
“poor”. Their frequency and intervals may also vary by weeks or even months, 
and such variances have not been captured in a single variable. Among the states 
with the most over-reported data include California and Minnesota, while those 
with the most underreported data include Massachusetts and Indiana. States such 
as Montana had a small number of ratings that were regular and consistent, and 
states such as New Hampshire had many ratings that were only available for 
single years. 
   States with 20 or more observations include Alabama, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Florida, and Minnesota. States with fewer than 
10 observations include Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, 
Vermont, and Washington. Such observations steadily increased after 1982 as 
polling activity began to pick up. The lowest reported approval rating for a 
governor was 16%, while the highest reported gubernatorial approval rating 
soared at 90%. The average popularity of governors sits at 56%. Though flawed, 
the use of this dataset still remains more accurate than other heuristics such as 
reelection and policy victories.  
  This data would be meaningless without the inclusion of surveying dates; 
however, in this study, I have further aggregated the data to include only a single 
year for each state. To do so, I used an average of each year’s gubernatorial 
approval ratings. This allows for the regression of events in a single year on 
gubernatorial approval.  
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  The dependent variable, gubernatorial approval, is a continuous variable 
representing the percentage of popularity of a given governor. In this dataset, the 
percentages of gubernatorial approval range from a low of 16% to a high of 
90.27%. The mean percentage of governors’ popularity is 56.63% with a standard 
deviation of 15.03.  
  Table 1 displays the five lowest reported gubernatorial approval ratings in 
the JAR dataset, and Table 2 references the five highest instances of governors’ 
popularity in the data. Among the first female governors elected, Barbara Roberts 
served in Oregon for only 4 years from 1991-1995. In that time, Governor 
Roberts faced a budget crisis following the passage of a bill that limited income 
taxes, which subsequently led to cuts in spending for social welfare programs that 
had been promised during campaign season. Not surprisingly, she chose not to see 
reelection given her low approval ratings. Mike Leavitt served as governor of 
Utah for 10 years from 1993 to 2003 and was cited twice among the highest 
approval ratings. During his tenure, Governor Leavitt enacted healthcare, welfare, 
educational, and environmental reform. He was eventually reelected for a third 
term and resigned only to serve of President George W. Bush’s cabinet. 
Table 1.1: Lowest Gubernatorial Approval Ratings (1978-2000)  
Governor State Year Popularity 
Barbara Roberts Oregon 1993 16% 
William Donald Schaefer Maryland 1993 16.16% 
Toney Anaya New Mexico 1986 17.83% 
Edwin Edwards Louisiana 1987 21.28% 
Gaston Caperton West Virginia 1989 21.46% 
 
Table 1.2: Highest Gubernatorial Approval Ratings (1978-2000) 
Governor State Year Popularity 
Roy Barnes Georgia 1999 90.27% 
Zell Miller Georgia 1998 88.47% 
Mike Leavitt Utah 1993 88.3% 
Tom Carper Delaware 2000 88% 
Mike Leavitt Utah 1994 87.37% 
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2.2 Independent Variable: States of Emergency (FEMA Data) 
  Fortunately, much to the opposite of gubernatorial popularity, data on 
natural and manmade disasters has been readily available for decades. Since 1953, 
the federal government has collected data on state and national disaster 
declarations. Such data includes the duration of the incident, date of disaster 
declaration, geographic information, and any financial assistance awarded. It is 
currently available on FEMA’s website without a Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) request.  
  The most important independent variable, the presence of a natural or 
manmade disaster, is a function of FEMA. FEMA recognizes natural and 
manmade disasters as those declared by the president. Disaster declarations are 
organized according to state/tribal government, disaster type, and declaration 
type. The process of declaring a state of emergency is a somewhat cumbersome 
event. State and local governments must first declare a state of emergency and 
then plead to their local FEMA chapter for additional resources. If approved, a 
governor will then declare a formal state of emergency in the state, which will 
then be overseen by the national government. Disasters that have had such an 
impact to be declared an emergency by the national FEMA office include those 
such as Hurricane Andrew, Hurricane Harvey, and Hurricane Katrina.  
  In this study, I utilize four separate dichotomous variables as measures of 
disaster declarations. Each of these four measures is included in the model as a 
separate dummy variable with a value of “1” if the disaster declaration occurred 
and “0” if a disaster declaration did not occur.  
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  Of the 360 reported occurrences of disaster declarations 1978-2000, 25 
were emergency declarations, which are less severe and include any natural or 
manmade disaster with damages not exceeding $5 million dollars. 39 of the 
occurrences were fire management assistance declarations, which include only 
forest or grassland fires. 296 of the occurrences were major disaster declarations, 
which are most severe and include only natural disasters with no specific limit on 
monetary damages. Incidents included severe storms, flooding, tornadoes, winter 
storms, sewer explosions, toxic waste, high winds, fire, hurricanes, extreme soil 
saturation, earthquakes, landslides, virus threats, terrorism, etc. Each of these was 
noted different depending on the particular states’ verbiage. For example, some 
states report “blizzards” while others report “heavy snowfall” or “snow 
accumulation”. There were also 263 instances where a state of emergency was not 
declared. 
  Though this study uses a simple measure for the occurrence of a natural or 
manmade disaster, with appropriate time, other studies may use insurance claims 
or total damages as a measure of the severity of a disaster. For the purposes of this 
study, I will not discern between natural and manmade disasters. Both events have 
similar, sustained negative effects on the populace that can affect the popularity of 
elected officials 
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2.3 Control Variables 
 The control variables in this study are numerous and varied. Studies of 
state-level approval have often only focused on one characteristic: economic 
performance. We now know that national-level factors can also have an effect on 
state-level politics. For example, the performance of the sitting president will 
have residual effects on the popularity of governors and state legislatures. While 
the Framers may have intended for entirely separate federal and state 
governments, in reality, the two are very much intertwined. It is important that 
models of state-level popularity include measures of presidential popularity as 
well as national economic performance. My model includes national-level, state-
level, and individual-level factors in considering the variance of gubernatorial 
approval ratings.  
 Despite being autonomous, individual states are not insulated from 
national happenings. Specifically, indicators of economic performance for the 
nation as a whole can very much affect a given state.  The national-level factor 
that affects a governor’s popularity is inflation. In this model, national-level 
inflation is the percentage change in the consumer price index, which ranges from 
63.5% to 173% with a standard deviation of 23.66. I also include another 
economic indicator: state-level unemployment.  State-level unemployment is 
measured as the percentage of the labor force that is unemployed according to the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics within the U.S. Department of Labor. From 1978-2000, 
the highest reported state unemployment rate was in the state of Alabama with 
14.15% of its labor force looking for work in 1982. In 2000, Connecticut 
presented the lowest reported state unemployment with only 2.15% of its 
workforce without wages. Both state-level and national-level unemployment were 
highly correlated, thus this model accounts only for unemployment within states. 
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 Reminiscent of models of presidential popularity, there are also a number 
of state-level factors that can affect a governor’s approval ratings. In this study, I 
include measures for unified/divided government in state legislatures, state 
ideology, population size, and diversity.  
 Unified government is presented as a simple dichotomous variable with 
“1” denoting that the governor is of the same party as the majority in the state 
legislator. This differs from the variable of state ideology, which is the net state 
partisanship score derived from the Erikson-Wright-McIver data on state 
partisanship and ideology (Erikson et al. 1993). King and Cohen (2005) calculate 
this value by subtracting the percentage of survey respondents who identify with 
the opposition party from the percentage of survey respondents who identify with 
the governor’s party. The variable for state ideology is the percentage of liberal 
voters minus the percentage of conservative voters, which ranges from -25.9% to 
29.5% with a standard deviation of 15.95.   
 Population size is a simple measure of the number of millions of citizens 
within the state. State populations range from Wyoming with fewer than 1 million 
people to California with over 30 million people. The diversity of such 
populations is measured by the Sullivan index, which includes proportions of 
race, gender, and profession (Morgan and Wilson 1990). The state with the 
highest population diversity is New York with nearly 58% while Arkansas is the 
state with the lowest population diversity with only 40%.  
 In addition to the factors out of his or her control, the individual-level 
characteristics of a particular governor can also have an effect on popularity. This 
study accounts for each governors’ party identification, length into his or her 
term, and the total percentage of votes won in the most recent general election. A 
governor’s party identification is measured simply with a dichotomous variable in 
which Democratic governors are coded as “1” and Republican governors are 
coded as “0”.  
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 The length of time that a governor has served is measured in months. 
Governor Bill Clinton had only been serving in Arkansas for 4 months prior to the 
occurrence of a disaster declaration while Governor Booth Gardner had already 
been serving for over 10 years when the last disaster declaration in his term took 
place. The percentage of the general election won by each governor is also a 
simple measure ranging from only 33% of the vote won by Governor Buddy 
Roemer in Louisiana to 82% of the votes won by Governor William Schaefer in 
Maryland.  
 I also include fixed effects for both state and year. This dataset includes 
observations from all 50 states ranging from 1978-2000. 
2.4 Methodology and Results 
  Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, gubernatorial 
popularity, this study utilizes a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) model. 
Though simple, such a model has become the standard within the literature. The 
model, which includes national-level, state-level, and individual-level factors, 
yielded some surprising results.  
  Table 3 contains the results of four models. Note, the same model is 
presented four times, but each model rotates the excluded category from the main 
variables of interest, which is the type of disaster declaration. This allows us to 
compare the influence of, say, fire assistance declarations to emergency 
declarations (e.g., Model 1) or any type of declaration to no declaration (e.g., 
Model 4).  
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  The model accounts for 52% of the variance of governors’ popularity in 
all 50 states from 1978-2000. The variance in the approval rating of a governor 
can best be explained by individual, state, and national level factors. Not 
surprisingly, the percentage of votes won in the general election is among the best 
predictors of a governor’s popularity. The higher the vote share, the more well-
liked a governor will be throughout his or her tenure. Similarly, governors’ 
approval ratings also declined the longer he or she was in office. Democratic 
governors fared much worse than their Republican counterparts. At the state-
level, the unemployment rate had a significant negative effect on gubernatorial 
approval ratings. Oppositely, the national inflation rate had a significant positive 
effect on gubernatorial approval ratings. Other state-level factors including the 
presence of unified government, state ideology, population size, and population 
diversity had no significant effects on a governor’s population.  
  Most notable, however, are the results between the three types of disaster 
declarations: emergency declarations, fire management assistance declarations, 
and major disaster declarations. Surprisingly, the three types of disaster 
declarations have no significant effects on gubernatorial approving ratings when 
compared to the nonoccurrence of a catastrophe (Model 4). However, when 
compared to an emergency declaration, major disaster declarations have a 
significant negative effect on a governor’s popularity. Oppositely, emergency 
declarations have a significant positive effect on a governor’s popularity when 
compared to major disaster declarations. Neither type of disaster declaration is 
significant on its own, but relative to one another, major disaster declarations 
make a governor less popular while emergency declarations make a governor less 
popular. Such findings are not surprising given the total dollar amount of damages 
for major disaster declarations will far exceed those of emergency declarations. 
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Gubernatorial Popularity 
Variable    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3         Model 4 
Emergency Declaration   Excluded 4.822    4.028^   3.146    
                       (3.208)   (2.377)    (2.461)    
 
Fire Assistance Declaration   -4.822    Excluded -0.794    -1.676    
                      (3.208)      (2.323)    (2.311)   
 
Major Disaster Declaration   -4.028^   0.794    Excluded -0.882    
                      (2.377)    (2.323)      (1.081)    
 
No Declaration             -3.146    1.676    0.882           Excluded 
                      (2.461)    (2.311)    (1.081)    
 
Democratic Governor               -4.889^ -4.889^   -4.889^           -4.889^   
                      (2.706)  (2.706)      (2.706)      (2.706)     
  
 
Unified Government              -0.962   -0.962      -0.962      -0.962      
                      (1.235)    (1.235)    (1.235)  (1.235)    
 
State Ideology              -0.050    -0.050    -0.050   -0.050    
                      (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)       
 
% Won of General Election            0.260*** 0.260*** 0.260***      0.260*** 
                      (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)       
 
State Unemployment (Lagged) -2.573*** -2.573*** -2.573***    2.573*** 
                      (0.553)  (0.553) (0.553) (0.553)      
 
Inflation              1.549*   1.549*   1.549*  1.549*   
                      (0.630)   (0.630)   (0.630)   (0.630)     
 
Population Diversity             78.982    78.982    78.982   78.982    
                    (93.777)  (93.777) (93.777)        (93.777)      
 
Population Size              0.292    0.292    0.292    0.292    
                      (0.861)   (0.861)   (0.861) (0.861)     
 
Length of Term (Months)            -0.088^  -0.088^ -0.088^            0.088^     
                      (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.045)   (0.045)    
N                     623    
R-sq                0.520    
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
^ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 (two-tailed) 
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CHAPTER 3. CONCLUSION 
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3.1 Scholarly and Practical Implications 
  The null results of this study beg the question, “Why don’t natural and 
manmade disasters have any effect on our governors’ popularity?” Given that 
governors are the most visible actors in the state and such disasters affect the 
wellbeing of citizens, we should expect to see a dip in approval ratings following 
the declaration of a state of emergency.  
  Perhaps the disasters themselves also do not affect individuals intensely 
enough for a long enough time to yield any difference in governors’ popularity. 
We may expect to see a change in approval rating for disasters that earn national 
coverage, including rare events such as Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 disaster, 
but events reoccurring year-to-year including snowstorms, floods, and forest fires 
tend to make up the majority of observations in this dataset. These issues may not 
be salient enough to result in electoral outcomes.  
  The null results may also be a result of incomplete data. There may not be 
enough gubernatorial approval data for years in which natural disasters occurs, 
and there is no variable to account for the time passed after a state of emergency 
before the surveys were taken. Similarly, it may be that any decline in popularity 
a governor may experience as a result of an emergency declaration may be very 
short lived, and thus would be difficult to discern with only yearly data. Future 
studies could also include more robust measures of these states of emergencies 
including insurance claims and money in damages as well as more fine grained 
monthly data, if possible. Rather than using a dichotomous measure of whether a 
disaster occurred that year with lagged approval ratings, one could parse out these 
ratings month-by-month if the data would allow.  
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  The availability of such data is important, and more scholars should 
commit to the upkeep of such a dataset. There should also be a push for the 
uniformity of polling data and questionnaires regarding the popularity of state and 
local level officials. It not only yields insight into how states govern themselves 
but also how national-level happenings may trickle down to state and local 
governments 
  Despite the lack of significant findings, we must not forget why an 
understanding of state-level popularity is important. The data does show that 
certain catastrophes may affect a governor’s approval ratings more than others. 
Compared to the quicker and less costly emergency declarations, major disaster 
declarations are more likely to have a negative effect on gubernatorial approval 
ratings.  
  Knowing this, state-level officials may begin to reevaluate their response 
to these natural and manmade disasters. If a governor understands that his or her 
popularity will plummet following a major disaster declaration, he or she may be 
more likely to act quickly when evaluating demanding and requesting assistance 
from the federal government. Governors and state legislators may also begin to 
focus on the preventive measures offered by the federal government following a 
major disaster declaration rather than relying only on immediate funding and 
resources. Though their motives may not be altruistic, a better understanding of 
gubernatorial popularity may lead to better decision-making by governors that 
will have tangible outcomes for citizens in the event of a state of emergency. 
 
29 
 
REFERENCES 
ACHEN, CHRISTOPHER H. AND LARRY M. BARTELS. 2012. “BLIND RETROSPECTION: WHY 
 SHARK ATTACKS ARE  BAD FOR DEMOCRACY” WORKING PAPER. 
ADAMS, GREGM AND PEVERILL SQUIRE. 2001. “A NOTE ON THE DYNAMICS AND 
 IDIOSYNCRASIES OF GUBERNATORIAL POPULARITY”. STATE POLITICS AND POLICY 
 QUARTERLY. 380-393.  
BARRILLEAUX, CHARLES AND MICHAEL BERKMAN. 2003. “DO GOVERNORS MATTER? 
 BUDGETING RULES AND  
THE POLITICS OF STATE POLICYMAKING.” POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 56 
 (DECEMBER): 409-417. 
BEYLE, THAD. 1999. “GOVERNORS” POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE 
 ANALYSIS. 7TH EDITION. WASHINGTON, DC. CQ PRESS.  
BEYLE, THAD, RICHARD G. NIEMI, AND LEE SIGELMAN. 2002. ‘GUBERNATORIAL, 
 SENATORIAL, AND STATE-LEVEL PRESIDENTIAL JOB APPROVAL: THE U.S. 
 OFFICIALS JOB APPROVAL RATINGS (JAR) COLLECTION” STATE POLITICS & 
 POLICY QUARTERLY. 2(3). 215-229.  
CREW, ROBERT E. AND GREGORY R. WEIHER. 1996. “GUBERNATORIAL POPULARITY IN 
 THREE STATES: A PRELIMINARY MODEL”. SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL. 39-55.  
CUTTER, S. L. AND C. EMRICH. 2005. “ARE NATURAL HAZARDS AND DISASTER LOSSES IN 
 THE U.S. INCREASING?” EOS, TRANSACTIONS, AMERICAN GEOPHYSICAL UNION. 8
 6(41). 381-396.  
EDWARDS, GEORGE C., WILLIAM MITCHELL, AND REED WELCH. “EXPLAINING 
 PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ISSUE SALIENCE”. AMERICAN 
 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. 39. 108-34.  
ERIKSON, ROBERT S., GERALD C. WRIGHT, AND JOHN P. MCIVER. 1993. STATEHOUSE 
 DEMOCRACY: PUBLIC  OPINION AND POLICY IN THE AMERICAN STATES. NEW 
 YORK. CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS.   
30 
 
FIORINA, MORRIS P. 1981. RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS. 
 CAMBRIDGE, MA: HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 
GARRETT, THOMAS A. AND RUSSELL S. SOBEL. 2007. “THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
 FEMA DISASTER PAYMENTS”. ECONOMIC INQUIRY. 41(3). 265-529.  
GASPER, JOHN T. AND ANDREW REEVES. 2012. “GOVERNORS AS OPPORTUNISTS: 
 EVIDENCE FROM DISASTER DECLARATION REQUESTS”. ANNUAL MEETING  PAPER. 
 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION.  
GRONKE, PAUL, AND BRIAN NEWMAN. 2003. “FROM FDR TO CLINTON, FROM MUELLER 
 TO ?? A FIELD ESSAY ON PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL.” POLITICAL RESEARCH 
 QUARTERLY 56:501–12. 
HOWELL, SUSAN E. AND JAMES M. VANDERLEEUW. 1990. “ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON STATE 
 GOVERNORS.”  AMERICAN POLITICS QUARTERLY. 18. 158-168.  
KEY, V.O. 1966. THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE. NEW YORK. VINTAGE BOOKS.  
KING, JAMES D. AND JEFFREY E. COHEN. 2005. “WHAT DETERMINES A GOVERNOR’S 
 POPULARITY?” STATE  POLITICAL AND POLICY QUARTERLY 5(3). 225-247.   
KLARNER, CARL E. AND ANDREW KARCH. 2008. “WHY DO GOVERNORS ISSUE VETOES? 
 THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCES.” POLITICAL 
 RESEARCH QUARTERLY 
MALHOTRA, NEIL AND ALEXANDER G. KUO. 2007. “ATTRIBUTING BLAME: THE PUBLIC’S 
 RESPONSE TO  HURRICANE KATRINA” THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS. 70(1). 1-16.  
MORGAN, DAVID R. AND LAURA A. WILSON. 1990. “DIVERSITY IN THE AMERICAN 
 STATES: UPDATING THE SULLIVAN INDEX.” PUBLIUS. 20: 71-81.  
MUELLER, JOHN E. 1973. WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND PUBLIC OPINION. JOHN WILEY & SONS. 
 1-326. 
REEVES, ANDREW. 2011. “POLITICAL DISASTER: UNILATERAL POWERS, ELECTORAL 
 INCENTIVES, AND PRESIDENTIAL DISASTER DECLARATIONS” THE JOURNAL OF 
 POLITICS. 73(4). 1142-1151.  
31 
 
ROSENTHAL, ALAN. 1990. GOVERNORS AND LEGISLATORS: CONTENDING POWERS. 
 WASHINGTON DC. CQ PRESS.  
SALKOWE, RICHARD S. AND JAYAJIT CHAKRABORTY. 2009. “FEDERAL DISASTER RELIEF IN 
 THE U.S.: THE  ROLE OF POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP AND PREFERENCE IN 
 PRESIDENTIAL DISASTER DECLARATIONS AND TURNDOWNS” THE JOURNAL OF 
 HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT. 6(1).  
SVOBODA, CRAIG. 1995. “RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: 1982 
 AND 1986”. POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY. 48. 135-150.  
32 
 
VITA 
Meghan E. Steinbeiss 
 
Education 
 M.A. Political Science, University of Kentucky (expected 2019) 
 B.A. Political Science, North Central College, Magna Cum Laude (2013) 
 
Professional Experience 
 September 2013-May 2015   Teaching Assistant 
       University of Kentucky 
 
 September 2012- November 2012  Preceptor  
       North Central College 
 
 June 2012- August 2012   Research Assistant 
       The Project on Race in Political  
       Communication/RaceProject 
 
 March 2012- June 2012   Research Assistant  
       Inequality in America Textbook by  
       Dr. Stephen Maynard Caliendo 
 
 August 2011- June 2012   Editor 
       Illinois State Bar Association  
       Publication “In the Alternative” 
 
Honors 
 University of Kentucky Teacher Who Made a Difference Award (2015) 
 
 
 
